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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Weaver'
(decided May 12, 2009)
Scott Weaver was arrested for two burglaries that took place
in Latham, New York.2 Prior to his arrest, Weaver was under elec-
tronic surveillance, and readings from a Global Positioning System
("GPS") placed on his vehicle were used as evidence against him
during his trial.3 Weaver moved to suppress the GPS information,
but his motion was summarily denied.4  Subsequently, a jury con-
victed Weaver of burglary.5 Although divided on the issue, the Ap-
pellate Division, Third Department, affirmed his conviction. 6 On ap-
peal to the New York Court of Appeals, Weaver alleged that the
warrantless installation of a GPS device on the exterior of his van
was an unreasonable search, and therefore violated his constitutional
rights pursuant to the United States Constitution' and the New York
Constitution.8 The New York Court of Appeals in a four to three de-
cision reversed Weaver's conviction and held that the warrantless in-
stallation of the GPS device on his vehicle infringed his constitutional
rights.9
On the morning of December 21, 2005, a State Police Investi-
gator attached a GPS tracking device to the bumper of Weaver's van,
909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
2 Id. at 1196.
3 Id.
5 Id.
6 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . ."
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12, states, in pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated . . . ."
9 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203 (granting Weaver's motion to suppress the evidence and
ordering a new trial).
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which was parked on a public street.'o The GPS tracking device con-
sistently monitored the van for sixty-five days, during which time, no
warrant was obtained." In order to retrieve information from the
GPS device on Weaver's van, an investigator had to drive by the van,
press a button on the receiver, and save the van's travel history to a
computer.12 Weaver was eventually arrested and charged with crimes
in connection with "two separate burglaries-one committed [in] July
2005 at the Latham Meat Market and the other on Christmas Eve of
the same year at the Latham K-Mart."13  At trial, the government
sought to introduce the tracking history of the GPS that revealed that
at 7:26 p.m. on the night of the K-Mart burglary, Weaver's van
passed through the K-Mart parking lot at a slow-moving "speed of
six miles per hour." 4 Weaver moved to suppress the GPS readings,
but was unsuccessful. 5 The trial proceeded with the admittance of
such evidence and Weaver was subsequently found guilty of the K-
Mart burglary.16  Weaver appealed and the appellate division af-
firmed, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed his conviction.' 7
Although Weaver asserted that his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches was violated under both the United
States Constitution and the New York Constitution, the New York
Court of Appeals reversed his conviction based solely on New York
constitutional principles.' 8 In reaching this determination, the court
noted that "the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon
whether the use of GPS by the state for the purpose of criminal inves-
tigation constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment."' 9 Never-
theless, in the past, the New York Court of Appeals "has not hesitated
to interpret article I, [section] 12 [of the New York Constitution] in-
dependently of its Federal counterpart when the analysis adopted by
to Id. at 1195. This GPS tracking device is also referred to as a "Q-ball," and is operated
by the use of satellites, which spots the location of the vehicle and its speed. Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1195-96.
12 Id at 1196.
13 Id.
14 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
15 Id.
16 Id. The jury acquitted Weaver "of the counts pertaining to the Meat Market burglary."
Id.
17 Id at 1196, 1197.
1 Weaver, 909 N.E. at 1202.
19 Id. The Weaver court also noted that most federal circuit courts have not addressed this
issue as well. Id
838 [Vol. 26
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the Supreme Court in a given area has threatened to undercut the
right of [its] citizens to be free from unreasonable government intru-
sions." 20 The court noted that the New York Constitution has been
interpreted to provide "greater protections when circumstances war-
rant," which has led New York courts to "develop[] an independent
body of State law in the area of search and seizure." 21
To determine whether a person has a privacy interest in the
realm of Fourth Amendment protection, a person must show "a sub-
jective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation would be
accepted as reasonable by society."22 The court found that the defen-
dant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated by the
installation of the GPS device, which tracked the movement of his
van for over two months, and thus constituted "a search under article
I, [section] 12 of the State Constitution."2 3 Consequently, the court
concluded that "[u]nder our State Constitution, in the absence of ex-
igent circumstances, the installation and use of a GPS device to moni-
tor an individual's whereabouts requires a warrant supported by
probable cause."24 The court's findings are reflective of Justice
White's opinion in Delaware v. Prouse,2 5 in which he stated, "people
are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step
from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of
those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automo-
biles."26
In reaching its conclusion, the Weaver court looked to other
20 People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (N.Y. 1990).
21 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. See also People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1342 (N.Y.
1992) ("An independent construction of our own State Constitution is particularly appropri-
ate where a sharp or sudden change in direction by the United States Supreme Court dramat-
ically narrows fundamental constitutional rights [of| of our citizens."); People v. Harris, 570
N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 1991) ("Our federalist system of government necessarily provides
a double source of protection and State courts, when asked to do so, are bound to apply their
own Constitutions notwithstanding the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.");
People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63 (N.Y. 1989) ("[A]Ithough the history and identical lan-
guage of the State and Federal constitutional privacy guarantees . . .support a policy of un-
iformity, this court has demonstrated its willingness to adopt more protective standards un-
der the State Constitution.") (internal quotations omitted).
22 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
23 Id. at 1202.
24 Id. at 1203.
25 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
26 Id. at 663.
2010] 839
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state courts' holdings as persuasive authority on the novel matter and
learned that other jurisdictions have held that the warrantless use of a
GPS device violates several state constitutional safeguards against
unreasonable searches and seizures.27
The majority further reasoned that surveillance of the defen-
dant for sixty-five days without the use of the GPS would not have
been feasible and that the use of such invasive technology by law en-
forcement to receive detailed information as to an individual's every-
day life does not coincide with the basic tenets that lie at the heart of
New York's constitutional protection against unreasonable
searches.28 According to the court, the privacy interest in the van
may not have been significant, but it was enough to support Weaver's
contention that his constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure had been violated; therefore, the invasion of his
privacy through the use of the GPS device defied even an insignifi-
cant expectation of privacy. 29
Judge Smith disagreed with the majority's assertion that cer-
tain technologies are "too modem and sophisticated" to be used by
law enforcement. 30 Even though Judge Smith believed that the instal-
lation "of the GPS device . . . violated [the] defendant's property
rights," he did not agree that it "invade[d] his privacy." 31
The United States Supreme Court has yet to confront the spe-
cific issue of whether the installation of a GPS device "constitute[s] a
search under the Fourth Amendment," but the Court has established a
standard to determine whether a defendant has standing to contest a
search under the Fourth Amendment.32 In Katz v. United States, the
27 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203. See also State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003)
(holding that people have a right to be free from governmental interference that occurs with
the installation of a GPS device to one's vehicle; therefore, law enforcement was required to
obtain a warrant before the device was installed); State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049
(Or. 1988) (holding that a radio transmitter used to detect the location of a vehicle consti-
tuted a search according to the Oregon State Constitution, and absent exigent circumstances
the use of the device was an infringement of the defendant's freedom against unreasonable
searches and seizures).
28 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203.
29 Id. at 1201.
30 Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
31 Id at 1206. See also People v. Natal, 553 N.E.2d 239, 240 (N.Y. 1990) ("[T]he exis-
tence of a property interest does not mean that [the] defendant also had a privacy interest
protectable by the State and Federal guarantees against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.").
32 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202.
840 [Vol. 26
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Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to conversations made in
a telephone booth.33 More specifically, the Court noted that the gov-
ernment violated the defendant's rights when agents wiretapped a
phone booth and eavesdropped on his conversation.3 4 Justice Har-
lan's concurring opinion sets out a two-prong test that has become
the leading standard in subsequent cases. The two-fold rule notes
that a person must have "an actual (subjective) expectation of priva-
cy" in the place being searched and that that expectation is "one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."35 Justice Harlan rea-
soned that although "the booth is accessible to the public," at the time
that Katz was in the booth with the door closed behind him, the booth
became "temporarily private," and therefore, any subjective expecta-
tion of privacy is reasonable.36
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed
GPS surveillance, the Court has faced the issue of surveillance tech-
nology in conjunction with Fourth Amendment protections in United
States v. Knotts. 37 In Knotts, Minnesota law enforcement agents in-
stalled a beeper in a five-gallon drum of chloroform and tracked the
movement of the drum to a remote cabin owned by the respondent.
The issue before the Court was whether the use of the beeper by law
enforcement violated the respondent's rights under the Fourth
Amendment. 39 Knotts unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evi-
dence obtained as a result of law enforcement's warrantless use of the
beeper, and he was subsequently convicted of conspiracy to manufac-
ture methamphetamine and other controlled substances in violation of
federal law.4 0 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed his con-
viction and held that such monitoring with a beeper was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment because it infringed on the "respondent's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.,41
In reversing the Eighth Circuit's decision, the Knotts Court re-
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
34 Id. at 348.
" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
36 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
Id. at 277.
40 Id. at 279.
41 id.
2010] 841
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lied on the well settled principle that individuals have a "diminished
expectation of privacy in an automobile."42 Employing this notion,
the Court found that the respondent had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his own cabin where the beeper was ultimately found, but
not in the vehicle that the beeper was transported in.43 Since the
Court held that the monitoring of the beeper did not infringe on any
legitimate expectation of privacy of the respondent, the surveillance
and tracking of the beeper signals did not constitute a "search nor a
seizure" under the Fourth Amendment.44 The Court further reasoned
42 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 n.2 (1978) (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) ("Automobiles operate on public streets; they are serviced in public plac-
es; . . . their interiors are highly visible; and they are subject to extensive regulation and in-
spection."); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's
residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . . It travels public thorough-fares where
[both] its occupants and its contents are in plain view.").
43 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282. Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (the
use of thermal-imaging technology to detect heat levels inside the home that could not have
been obtained without actually entering the home was considered a search because the use of
such technology "is not in general public use"), with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986) ("The Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been extended to require
law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thorough-
fares. . . . [Especially] where he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly vis-
ible.").
4 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 (internal quotations omitted). The federal courts of appeals
have been split over whether installing a tracking beeper in a vehicle converts its monitoring
into a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Compare United States v. Garcia, 474
F.3d 994, 996-97 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that the installation of a GPS tracking device to an
individual's vehicle does not constitute a search nor a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment), and United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that there was no unreasonable search or seizure because the officers did not substantially
interfere with the defendant's possessory interest in his vehicle), and United States v. Mi-
chael, 645 F.2d 252, 256 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the attachment of a tracking device to
a vehicle "parked in a public place" is only a minimal intrusion, and thus not a violation of a
defendant's Fourth Amendment protections), and United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854,
860-61 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that neither the installation of a tracking device nor the con-
stant surveillance of a vehicle with a tracking device violates any reasonable expectation of
privacy of the defendant), and United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976)
(noting that because vehicles travel on public roadways, the installation of a tracking device
on a defendant's vehicle is not a violation of "any reasonable expectation of privacy"), with
United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944-45 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that to satisfy Fourth
Amendment protections, surveillance of a vehicle must be supported "by a warrant based on
probable cause"), and United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382, 1387 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting
that surveillance of a vehicle must be supported by "probable cause and exigent circums-
tances"), and United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111, 112 (1st Cir. 1977) (holding that
"the placing of beepers, without warrant, in contraband, stolen goods and the like on the
theory that the possessors of such articles have no legitimate expectation of privacy in sub-
stances which they have no right to possess at all" does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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that the use of scientific enhancements was not unconstitutional, but
an efficient means to observe what is already out in the open.45 In
justifying this assertion, the Court noted "[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibit[s] the police from augmenting the sensory fa-
culties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as
science and technology afforded them in this case." 46 It can be pre-
sumed that the Court viewed such surveillance as a heightened sense
of vision, which is not prohibited by the Constitution.
Subsequent to Knotts, the Supreme Court was once again
called upon to address the issue of whether law enforcement is re-
quired to obtain a warrant in order to install and monitor a beeper.4 7
In United States v. Karo, the government installed and monitored a
beeper that was placed in a canister of ether.48 The canister of ether
was to be used by the defendants to remove "cocaine from clothing
that had been imported into the United States." 49 Karo and other co-
conspirators were charged with "conspiring to possess cocaine with
[the] intent to distribute" after law enforcement legally searched a
home based on information obtained through the use of the beeper.o
The respondents moved to suppress the evidence discovered from the
home on the basis that the initial installation and monitoring of the
beeper was not authorized through a valid warrant.5 ' The district
court granted Karo's motion to suppress the evidence, and the court
of appeals affirmed because the beeper was installed without a war-
rant and because law enforcement monitored the can of ether while it
was in the confines of a private residence.52 In sum, the lower courts
found that Karo's Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
The Supreme Court in Karo found that the transfer of a can
that had an unmonitored beeper in it did not violate a privacy interest
of the transferee (Karo), because it did not provide any information.54
45 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284. The Court stated "[w]e have never equated police efficiency
with unconstitutionality. . . ." Id.
46 Id. at 282.
47 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984).
48 Id. at 708.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 710.
51 Id.
" Karo, 468 U.S. at 710.
53 Id. at 711.
54 Id. at 712.
2010] 843
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The unmonitored beeper may have created a potential invasion of
privacy, but an actual invasion did not occur; if so, the installation of
the beeper would have been considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment.5 5  According to the Court, "[i]t is the exploitation of
technological advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not
their mere existence." 56 Accordingly, the Court concluded that nei-
ther Karo's, nor the other respondents' Fourth Amendment protec-
tions were violated "by the installation of the beeper"; however, the
use of a beeper inside a private home infringed upon the Fourth
Amendment rights of those who had a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the home.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
GPS surveillance in the context of the Fourth Amendment, at least
one lower federal court has decided the issue. In United States v.
Moran,8 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York specifically addressed whether the use of a GPS tracking
device that was placed on an individual's vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment. 59 The defendant was charged with narcotics trafficking
based in part on evidence discovered through the use of a GPS device
that traced the location of his vehicle on July 29 and 30, 2003 .60 Mo-
ran moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS device
claiming that the GPS surveillance violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. 61 The court denied his motion because it determined that GPS
surveillance is akin to visual surveillance by law enforcement
agents.62
The district court, relying on the conclusions set forth in
Knotts, held that Moran did not have an expectation of privacy in the
vehicle because his vehicle was traveling on a public highway, and
5 Id. The Court cautioned that equating an invasion of privacy with a Fourth Amendment
search would suggest "that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic micro-
phone capable of picking up conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search
even if the microphone were not turned on." Id.
56 Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
5 Id. at 713. The Court noted that "private residences are places in which the individual
normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a warrant, and
that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable." Id. at 714.
" 349 F. Supp. 2d 425 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
' Id. at 467.
60 Id. at 432, 467.
61 Id. at 432-33.
62 Id. at 467, 468.
844 [Vol. 26
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therefore, "there was no search or seizure" that violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.63 Consequently, the court denied the defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence.64
New York courts have also addressed GPS surveillance by
law enforcement in the context of search and seizure. The constitu-
tional issue concerning GPS surveillance was before the Nassau
County Court in People v. Lacey.65 On July 8, 2002, police officers
investigated two residential burglaries, which became the first of ap-
proximately twenty five burglaries that occurred in Nassau County
between July and August of that year.66 The following month, anoth-
er burglary took place and "[t]he license plate number" of the geta-
way car was checked by police and the owner was identified. 67 The
lead detective attached a GPS device to the vehicle while it was
parked on the side of the road allowing him to track the vehicle and
ultimately the defendant, Lacey.68 Based on the evidence obtained
through the use of the GPS device, the police had probable cause to
arrest Lacey for burglary.69 Lacey asserted that the evidence discov-
ered by using the GPS device was illegally obtained "without a
search warrant," and therefore it should have been suppressed. 70 La-
cey argued that his right against unreasonable searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution had been vi-
olated.7 1  The court recognized that the constitutional safeguard
against unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to Article I, sec-
tion 12 has been interpreted broadly. 72 As a case of first impression,
the Lacey court examined whether the broad interpretation of Article
63 Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
4 Id. at 468.
6' No. 2463N/02, 2004 WL 1040676, at *1 (Nassau County Ct. May 6, 2004).
66 Id.
67 Id. at *2.
68 Id. at *1.
69 Id. at *4.
70 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4. The Moran Court found it worth mentioning that the
Lacey court failed to not only uphold the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
Knotts, but failed to even mention Knotts in its decision. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
7n Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4.
72 Id. (search and seizure protections have been extended to "telephone and telegraph
communications" as well). See also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12 which states, in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of telephone and
telegraph communications shall not be violated ....
2010] 845
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I, section 12 included the installation of GPS devices.73
The Lacey court held that "in the absence of exigent circums-
tances," law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to attaching a
GPS to an automobile. 74 However, the defendant did not have a legi-
timate expectation of privacy in the vehicle because he was not the
rightful owner; therefore, he lacked standing to contest the search.75
Nevertheless, the court found that even though "persons have [a] di-
minished expectation[] of privacy" in a vehicle because of its visible
public use, simply parking a vehicle on the side of a public street
does not give law enforcement the unfettered right to interfere with
the vehicle by installing a GPS device without the consent of the
owner or without a court ordered warrant.76 According to the Lacey
court, Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution gives indi-
viduals the right to be free from the invasiveness of cellular technol-
ogy; since a GPS requires such cellular technology, the court con-
cluded that Lacey's constitutional right was violated.77 Judge
Calabrese further asserted that "[t]he citizens of New York have the
right to be free in their property, especially in light of technological
advances .... Technology cannot abrogate our constitutional protec-
,,78tions.
One year later, a Westchester County Court addressed the is-
sue of GPS surveillance in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution. 9 In People
v. Gant, the defendant was indicted on several counts of possession
of a controlled substance.8 0 The defendant "move[d] to suppress any
and all evidence obtained as a result of the use of . .. [the GPS] de-
vice" that was installed on a motor home.8 ' He claimed that the war-
rantless use of such device violated Article I, section 12 of the New
York Constitution and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
7 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *4.
74 Id. at *8
7 Id. at *10. See also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 (in order to claim Fourth Amendment pro-
tection, a person must have "a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place being
searched).
76 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8.
77 Id. at *7.
78 id.
7 802 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Westchester County Ct. 2005).
80 Id. at 840.
8Id. at 845.
846 [Vol. 26
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United States Constitution. 82 The court denied Gant's motion to sup-
press because he failed to show a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the place that was searched. 83  The defendant was unable to prove
that he was either the owner or an authorized passenger with a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle itself " 84
The Gant court relied on Knotts and Moran, which based their
findings on the fact that the defendant did not have a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the vehicle because of the public nature and
public use of motor vehicles. Moreover, the court found that the
New York Constitution does not provide greater privacy protection
than the United States Constitution, because New York courts and
statutory regulations have diluted the expectation of privacy that one
has in a motor vehicle based on the innate mobility and public opera-
tion of vehicles.86 Therefore, the court found that law enforcement
was not obligated to obtain a search warrant before they attached the
GPS device to the defendant's vehicle.
The majority in Gant found that its decision was consistent
with that of Lacey." However, this does not appear to be the case.
According to the Lacey court, the owner of a vehicle has a right to be
free from governmental intervention when it comes to tampering with
the owner's property without a warrant; therefore, if the defendant is
the rightful owner of the vehicle there is a contravention of his consti-
tutional protection.89 The Gant court was more focused on the inhe-
rent mobility of motor vehicles in general, whereas, the Lacey court
justified its holding on the basis of the attenuated relationship that the
defendant had with the vehicle, and not because of the vehicle's pub-
lic mobility or its location on the side of the street. Although the La-
cey court found that the defendant did not have a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in the vehicle that was installed with the GPS tracking
82 id
83 Id. (noting that if there is no expectation of privacy, there is no Fourth Amendment
search or seizure implications).
' Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
SId. at 847. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
Id. at 847-48.
88 Id. at 848 ("The Lacey [c]ourt ... held that defendant ... had no standing to assert that
the evidence resulting from GPS monitoring on the vehicle should be suppressed. Likewise,
Defendant herein has failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, or
in the vehicle's whereabouts .. . .").
89 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *8.
2010] 847
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device, the justification for such a result was visibly different from
that of the Gant court. The Gant court relied on the logic of Knotts
and Moran, which reasoned that since a motor vehicle travels on pub-
lic roadways and thoroughfares, law enforcement is not obligated to
obtain a warrant in order to attach the GPS device to the vehicles. 90
On the other hand, the Lacey court came to the conclusion Lacey's
right against unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated be-
cause of his status; he was not the rightful owner of the vehicle. 9'
The reasoning employed by the Weaver court coincides more
with that of the Lacey court, because an opposite holding may be
construed as support for the abuse and/or avoidance of a person's li-
berties by law enforcement officials. 92  As technology improves,
Weaver suggests that the scope of searches and seizures should not
remain stagnant, but alternatively, should broaden with such technol-
ogical advances to secure the privacy interests of the public.
There are not only inconsistencies between the state court de-
cisions themselves, but between New York and federal cases dealing
with GPS and other tracking devices. In the past, the New York
Court of Appeals has opted to use independent standards under the
New York Constitution, "when doing so best promotes 'predictability
and precision in judicial review of search and seizure cases and the
protection of the individual rights of our citizens.' "93 But this aim
has not been met considering the inconsistency between Lacey and
Gant.
The majority in Weaver briefly discussed that the beeper used
to track the chloroform in Knotts was considered more archaic than
the advanced GPS device used in Weaver, but recognized that at an
earlier point in history the beeper was cutting-edge technology. 94
Even though certain technology can one day be considered obsolete,
constitutional protections are constant. The distinction between the
beeper and the GPS device that the Weaver majority made was mis-
guided. The difference between the two should not have been based
on their respective capabilities because relative to their times, they
90 Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d at 847. See also Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d
at 467.
91 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *10.
92 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203.
9 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556, 561 (N.Y. 1986) (quoting People v. John-
son, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445 (N.Y. 1985)).
94 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. But see id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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were both progressive technology. Instead, how these devices are
used should be the proper scrutiny.
There was a certain distinction that seemed to be overlooked
in Gant-a distinction between the installation of a tracking device
inside an object located inside an automobile and the actual installa-
tion of a tracking device on the vehicle itself There is a difference
between tracking the whereabouts of a particular good (e.g., a chemi-
cal) and tracking a vehicle, with the end goal to locate an individual.
The tracking of an individual by attaching a GPS tracking device to
the vehicle implicates a "big brother society" that the Lacey court
sought to avoid.95  The Weaver court came to a conclusion that
seemed protects the privacy interests of the defendant, rather than ad-
vancing the investigatory function of the police; but like the Lacey
court, Weaver overlooks the importance of distinguishing itself from
Knotts by examining in what capacity the GPS was used.
In Weaver, Judge Smith's dissent points out that "[o]ne who
travels on the public streets . . . takes the chance that he or she will be
observed," but by traveling on public streets one does not take the
chance of being monitored by a GPS device that was attached to his
vehicle without his knowledge.96 It has been repeatedly argued that
one has a "diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile."97
However, it seems as though the expectation of privacy has not been
diminished, but instead has become non-existent. In what circums-
tance would the expectation of privacy only be diminished rather than
compromised? The majority in Weaver declared:
[I]t is one thing to suppose that the diminished expec-
tation affords a police officer certain well-
circumscribed options for which a warrant is not re-
quired and quite another to suppose that when we
drive or ride in a vehicle our expectations of privacy
are so utterly diminished that we effectively consent to
the unsupervised disclosure to law enforcement au-
9 Lacey, 2004 WL 1040676, at *7 (internal quotations omitted).
96 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
97 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (emphasis added). See also Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590
("One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transpor-
tation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.. .. It
travels public thoroughfares where [both] its occupants and its contents are in plain view.");
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153-54 (Powell, J., concurring).
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thorities of all that GPS technology can and will re-
veal.98
The Weaver decision complicates the progeny of Knotts,
which has only exhibited an all or nothing situation with regards to
this expectation of privacy.
Weaver appears to reconcile itself with the Lacey court, but
many questions remain unanswered, such as-when is technology
considered a tool of efficiency for law enforcement and when is it
considered an abusive tool to intrude upon the lives of citizens? This
has been a balancing act in all realms of the Fourth Amendment. The
broad language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, section 12 of
the New York Constitution have posed difficult obstacles in the past
and will continue to pose difficult obstacles in the future, as the terms
"search" and "seizure" will be harder to define with the advent of
more sophisticated technology.
Michelle Kliegman
98 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200.
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